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Abstract 
An inference from game-theory models of animal conflict is that adversaries should not inform 
one another about their level of aggressive motivation. This poses a paradox for the traditional 
ethological account of graded aggressive displays because it is usually assumed that the adaptive 
significance of these behavior patterns lies in their making such information available. To resolve the 
paradox, I propose that communication is only an incidental effect of displays, and that their primary 
adaptive function is regulation of the intensity of aggressive encounters through positive feedback on 
aggressive motivation, a process termed "behavioral efference." Evidence in support of this hypothesis 
is drawn from studies of human facial expression, aggressive catharsis, and operant conditioning of 
aggressive behavior. Implications of the hypothesis and suggestions for further work are discussed. 
Introduction 
Aggressive displays in vertebrates seldom consist of a single action pattern 
performed at a typical intensity (MORRIS 1957). Instead, in many species, the 
magnitude of severa1,~cmponents of the display posture is continuously variable 
over a broad range (e. g. LORENZ 1966, on dogs and geese; LEYHAUSEN 1956, on 
cats; BROWN 1964, on Steller's jays). In others, aggressive communication 
involves a diverse collection of distinctive action patterns (ANDERSSON 1980). The 
latter case is typified by TINBERGEN'S (1959) ethogram of twelve different aggres- 
sive behavior patterns in gulls or SERPELL'S (1982) description of up to twenty 
aggressive action patterns in lorikeets. 
One of the best-established tenets of ethology has been that this gradation in 
aggressive displays carries information about the motivational state of an animal 
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(LORENZ 1966; SMITH 1977). Where the behaviors are distinctive, they can usually 
be ordered in a sequence from low to high levels of aggressive motivation through 
their association with differing degrees of likelihood of attack or withdrawal in 
the contest (LORENZ 1981; TINBERGEN 1959; HINDE 1981). Similarly, continuously 
intergrading postures can generally be associated with a continuous variation in 
underlying motivational states (LORENZ 1966). 
The second major component of the traditional e~hological view is that 
aggressive displays serve as a substitute for combat, an alternative and less 
hazardous means of assessing aggressive superiority (TINBERGEN 1951). It  seems 
essential to this view that resolution of conflicts by display and by fighting should 
yield similar outcomes: An individual that would have been defeated in actual 
combat should not generally be able to win through display alone. Thus, the 
central evolutionary function of aggressive display, in the traditional view, is to 
provide a truthful indication of the aggressive capabilities of the displaying 
individual. Given the empirical association between display behavior and aggres- 
sive motivation, it follows that the functional significance of complex, graded 
displays lies in their providing information to an opponent about the displaying 
animal's inner aggressive state. 
This interpretation of aggressive display has recently been contested by 
investigators concerned with the evolution of display behavior. MAYNARD SMITH 
(1972, 1974) conceptualized animal conflict as a two-person game in which each 
participant chooses among a number of possible strategies, ranging from pure 
display to immediate attack, on the basis of their expected fitness payoffs. Each 
individual is seen as attempting to maximize its access to resources and to 
minimize its risk of active combat by manipulating the information available to its 
opponent. 
The game formalism divides the attributes of the participants into two 
groupings: those that contribute to an underlying difference in relative fighting 
ability that would determine the outcome if the conflict were escalated to a 
physical attack, and those that reflect the individual's choice of display strategy. 
Through similar but independent lines of argument addressed to each of these 
groupings, game theorists have concluded that there is no selective pressure 
favoring truthfulness in aggressive displays with respect to either fighting ability 
or strategic intentions (MAYNARD SMITH 1974, 1982, 1984; DAWKINS & KREBS 
1978; CARYL 1979, 1982 a, b). The latter argument, which is the principal concern 
of this paper, can be summarized as follows. 
In a game between rational competitors, each participant's choice of strategy 
will be strongly influenced by the strategic decisions of his opponent: one is more 
likely to feel confident of attacking an opponent who is clearly unprepared to 
reciprocate. Revealing one's probability of attacking or willingness to continue 
the interaction ought to be avoided in these circumstances because it would allow 
the opponent to formulate effective countermeasures. Players in the aggression 
game should, therefore, avoid communicating their "intentions" to one another. 
By extension, motivational information should never be expressed in aggressive 
displays. 
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The use of the term "intentions" by game theorists is understandable, but 
unfortunate, because it appears to introduce irrelevant issues of consciousness and 
intentionality of communication. The moves of a chess master are certainly 
intentional, but it is hard to view the actions of an aggressive Siamese fighting fish 
in the same light. If we disregard the terminological inelegance, however, the 
game theoretic argument poses a serious problem for the traditional view of 
animal aggression. Simply stated, if the function of aggressive displays is to 
resolve a conflict over resources, and if the more aggressive individual will win a 
disproportionate share of such conflicts, why should it ever be adaptive to display 
a motivational level that is lower than one's opponent? 
Aggressive display, by this argument, should evolve to  a single action 
pattern that is consistently produced at maximum intensity, thereby providing no 
information about differences in motivation (MAYNARD SMITH 1984). The occur- 
rence of complex, gaded  aggressive displays therefore constitutes a paradox 
(DAWKINS & KREBS 1978). If they are truthful reflections of the animal's internal 
state, why has revealing such information not been selected against? If they are 
not truthful indicators of motivation, why should they exhibit such remarkable 
diversity (ANDERSSON 1980; SERPELL 1982)? 
The response of many ethologists has been to argue that graded signals do  
occur and are sufficiently predictive of the future behavior of the displaying 
animal, povided that one correctly interprets the conditional and probabilistic 
nature of the message (HINDE 1981 ; SMITH 1986; BARLOW & ROWELL 1984; VAN 
RHIJN 1980). Hence, displays do, in fact, ~ r o v i d e  valid information about the 
displaying individual. The implication is that the paradox is some sort of artifact 
of the game theory approach or  the result of overlooking additional factors, such 
as the occurrence of repeated encounters between individuals that can remember 
and recognize one another (VAN RHIJN 1980; VAN RHIJN & VODEGEL 1980). 
This does not, however, fully address the source of the problem. The 
paradox owes nothing to game theory, as such. The theorists simply encountered 
it in the course of developing a rigorous model for the evolution of displays. The 
importance of the game-theoretic argument is in revealing that the two central 
features of the traditional ethological account of aggression - that graded 
displays present valid information about the internal states of the displaying 
animal and that the display of such information is, in fact, the central function of 
the behavior - are fundamentally incompatible. 
In a companion article (BOND 1989), I have suggested modifying the first 
assumption to  allow for deception in the communication of fighting ability. This 
argument of "optimal deceit'" cannot constitute a complete answer to the paradox, 
however. It addresses only components of fighting ability; its application to 
motivation or  "intentions" is, at best, tangential (MAYNARD SMITH 1982; CARYL 
1982 a). 
T o  resolve the paradox, we must address the second assumption, that a 
central function of aggressive displays is the communication of motivational states 
(e.g. ANDREW 1963). One  logical alternative is that displays can be used as 
predictors of subsequent actions and do, therefore, provide truthful reflections of 
aggressive motivation or intent, but that truthful communication is only a side- 
effect. The principal adaptive function of graded aggressive displays, I wish to 
argue, is regulation of aggressive arousal. 
The Argument for Behavioral Efference 
The adaptive significance of aggressive behavior is, presumably, that more 
aggressive individuals often enjoy a greater access to limiting resources (ARCHER 
1988). Aggression can also be dangerous, however; An animal that engages in 
active combat runs a significant risk of injury, even if it wins the encounter (GEIST 
1974). In species that make use of aggressive displays, escalation to active combat 
is often unnecessary because many conflicts can be resolved by display alone 
(TINBERGEN 1951; DAWKINS & KREBS 1978). Individuals that resort too readily to 
physical attack, therefore, will fight many battles that need not have been fought 
and run a significantly higher risk of injury. 
Rapid escalation can also be damaging to inclusive fitness. Stimuli that 
release aggression are presented by mates and offspring, as well as conspecific 
opponents (LORENZ 1966). Innumerable mechanisms provide protection against 
mate aggression, including individual recognition, submissive behavior, and 
bonding rituals (LORENZ 1966). All of these mechanisms require time, however, 
time for the mate to respond, time for the recognition to take effect. Individuals 
that attack apparent opponents immediately, with few preliminaries, may have 
difficulty in maintaining stable pair-bonds. 
Although there may be a general benefit to being aggressive, therefore, the 
risk of injury to oneself and one's mate and offspring appears to be high enough 
that rapid escalation ought to be selected against. This is reflected in common 
parlance in the disapproval of individuals who cannot "hold their tempers," or 
who tend to "fly off the handle." It  seems reasonable, therefore, to expect 
selection for a resting level of aggressive arousal that is considerably below the 
maximum, as well as for behavioral mechanisms that regulate the rate of arousal 
during an interaction. 
In animals with complex, graded displays, aggressive interactions are charac- 
teristically escalated in that low-intensity behavior patterns are progressively 
replaced by higher-intensity ones (ARCHER 1988 cites several examples). Given the 
evidence, cited earlier, that such behavior is indicative of different levels of 
aggressive motivation, an escalating interaction indicates a graded arousal process, 
a gradual increase in aggressive motivation over the course of the encounter. 
The adaptive significance of this behavior is that by postponing physical 
attack a graded arousal process increases the likelihood that contextual factors, 
such as submissive signals or individual recognition, can intervene and halt the 
interaction, thereby reducing the frequency of unnecessary combat and prevent- 
ing injury to mates or offspring. This argument is similar to SCHERER'S (1985) 
suggestion that requiring an individual to build up a particular level of arousal 
prior to acting, "allows a reevaluation of the eliciting antecedent event . . . and an 
evaluation of the likely consequences of the behavioral response alternatives." 
As a corollary to this interpretation, the selective value of postponing attack 
should be greater in species with more formidable weapons. We might, therefore, 
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expect a relationship between the size of the repertoire of aggressive displays in a 
given species and the potential for causing injury. Such a relationship is beauti- 
fully illustrated in SERPELL'S (1982) work on lorikeets, which are small, aggressive 
parrots in the genus Trichoglossus. In a survey of the display repertoires of nine 
species, Serpell found that the larger, heavier-billed species, which are capable of 
inflicting serious injuries, had repertoires of up to twenty highly ritualized 
display behaviors. In contrast, smaller species with a less powerful bite had 
repertoires of as few as five behaviors and a much higher tendency to escalate to 
physical attack (SERPELL 1982). 
We must then ask why escalation is characteristically progressive. What 
causes the consistent increment in aggressive arousal? Clearly, a principal source 
of stimulation is provided by the opponent. DAWKIN~ & KREBS (1978) have likened 
aggressive interactions in species with graded displays to an auction, in which two 
individuals bid against each other at progressively higher levels, up to the point at 
which one of them withdraws (a similar analogy is proposed by Dow et al. 1976). 
It seems unlikely, however, that the behavior of the opponent is the sole source of 
aggressive stimulation. Many species will show intense, escalated attacks on 
mirror images, in spite of the fact that the "opponent" in these cases is incapable 
of making a higher bid (GALLUP 1968). Escalation commonly occurs even in 
interactions with inanimate models (HOGAN & ROPER 1978). 
One means of accounting for these effects is the hypothesis of "behavioral 
efference," of positive feedback from the expression or display of aggressive 
tendencies to the internal motivational state. Display is, in this view, not merely 
indicative of a particular level of motivation, but actually instrumental in achiev- 
ing and sustaining it. The characteristic escalation of aggressive interactions is, 
then, simply a reflection of the positive feedback: Higher levels of aggression are 
commonly attained as a consequence of the animal's having previously performed 
lower-level aggressive displays. 
The concept of behavioral efference thus provides a means for directly 
regulating the rate of intensification of an aggressive interaction. Threshold levels 
of aggressive arousal are linked to specific display behavior, with each display in a 
graded series requiring a successively higher level of arousal in order to perform 
it. Performance of an aggressive display then increases the level of arousal, thus 
enabling the animal subsequently to produce an even more intense display. 
Unless other factors intervene, such as capitulation or withdrawal of one of the 
participants, the motivational and behavioral increments will cascade up the 
intensity scale until a leve1,of arousal is reached that is compatible with physical 
attack. 
Since aggressive interactions do not invariably accelerate to active combat, 
termination of the process must commonly be brought about by additional, 
inhibitory factors. There are indications of inhibitory feedbacks of aggressive 
performance on motivation: aggression appears to "satiate" (POTEGAL & TEN 
BRINK 1984; BAENNINGER 1966). This appears to be true of aggressive display, as 
well as physical combat (HOGAN & ROPER 1978). The principal source of inhibi- 
tory regulation, however, is probably the behavior of the opponent. 
It is in this context that the traditional account of displays as mixtures of 
aggression and fear, of arousal and inhibition, comes into play (HINDE 1981). The 
effect of the opponent's displays would depend on the level of aggressive 
motivation to which they corresponded. Displays indicative of higher arousal 
might be inhibitory, as would signs of submission or subordinate status. Displays 
indicating an equivalent or  somewhat lower level of motivation, on the other 
hand, could serve to accelerate the rate of arousal (ARCHER 1988): 
Displays do, thus, serve to  communicate an opp6nent's intentions, but the 
communication is, in OTTE'S (1974) terms, an "effect," rather than a "function" of 
the behavior. In the behavioral efference model, graded aggressive signals are the 
causal equivalent of "intention movements." Intention movements are not, in 
general, selected for communication, but are rather the mechanical preliminaries 
to some subsequent act (MOYNIHAN 1982). The characteristic crouch and partial 
wingspread in alarmed birds communicates their intention to fly, but the behavior 
also provides the necessary physical preparation for the leap that will make them 
airborne. Similarly, aggressive displays may incidentally communicate an ani- 
mal's probability of attack, but only as a result of their function in increasing 
aggressive arousal. 
If behavioral efference exists, why should it be evolutionarily stable? MAY- 
NARD SMITH'S (1982; 1984) argument concerns a hypothetical mutant that always 
displays the most extreme level of aggression, no matter what its actual intentions 
are, and thereby wins a disproportionate share of its aggressive encounters. What 
is to prevent such a mutation from spreading throughout the population? The 
reason may be that a mutant could not simply acquire the ability to produce 
displays without the corresponding level of motivation: it would also have to 
develop an alternative means of regulating aggressive interactions. Otherwise, 
decoupling behavior from arousal would free aggressive actions from the control 
provided by the graded arousal process and increase the risk of unnecessary 
injury. 
An illustration of the difficulties involved in selecting for concealment of 
intentions is provided by the expression of the emotions in humans. The 
evolution of human language has provided a secondary channel for the communi- 
cation of intentions and motivation, a channel that is not directly linked to the 
regulation of arousal. In consequence, it is relatively easy for humans to provide 
false verbal information, to  declare "I am very angry" or "I love you" in the 
absence of any corresponding motivational state. It is, however, extremely 
difficult for most people to lie successfully about motivations, because the older, 
nonverbal components of behavior that are still tied into the original control 
mechanism provide contrasting signals that give away one's true intent (EKMAN 
1985). Even professional actors, when asked to simulate a specified emotional 
state, can do  so effectively only by deliberately recalling an incident in their past 
that evokes an appropriate emotional accompaniment (EKMAN 1985). 
The Evidence for Behavioral Efference 
Behavioral. efference is scarcely a novel idea. Idioms such as "working 
oneself into a rage" (cf. LORENZ 1966, p. 154) convey a common acceptance of the 
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need for self-arousal prior to a physical attack. Familiar examples include the 
"warm-up" activities performed by athletes or  warriors before a contest, in which 
they engage in aggressive displays, vocalize, and build their hostility in the 
absence of opponents, so as to be fully prepared when the moment of combat 
arrives (POTEGAL 1979). 
Direct experimental evidence of the influence of performance on motivation 
is remarkably rare in the ethological literature, however. There are some data 
available from studies of courtship behavior, in which the stimulatory or  poten- 
tiating effects of display performance have long been recognized (e. g. MORRIS 
1956). In a particularly elegant experiment, WILZ (1970) was able to  show that 
performance of the "creeping through" display by male sticklebacks was instru- 
mental in switching their own predisposition from aggression to courtship. 
The absence of similar results on the effect of aggressive displays may simply 
indicate that they have not been looked for. The traditional paradigm has been 
that motivation accumulates continuously until the behavior is "released" by an 
appropriate stimulus (LORENZ 1950). This viewpoint appears to  have focused 
primary attention on the role of the stimulus, rather than the response, in 
aggression. For example, HEILIGENBERG (1965) and LEONG (1969), who conducted 
some of the best-known and best-regarded experiments on aggressive motivation 
(HUNTINGFORD 1980), concerned themselves exclusively with the effect of the 
stimulus models they presented and apparently did not consider the effects of the 
display behavior that the models elicited. Indirect evidence of behavioral effer- 
ence in aggression can, however, be adduced from a variety of different sources, 
including studies of human facial expression, of aggressive catharsis, and of the 
operant conditioning of aggressive behavior. 
Studies of Facial Expression 
The theory of "facial efference" asserts that the experience of emotion 
derives from feedback from facial expressions. The roots of the idea can be traced 
to DARWIN'S 'Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals.' In his summary 
chapter, he stated the hypothesis in unequivocal terms: 
"The free expression by outward signs of an emotion intensifies it . . . H e  
who gives way to violent gestures will increase his rage; he who does not 
control the signs of fear will experience fear in a greater degree . . . These 
results follow partly from the intimate relation which exists between almost 
all the emotions and their outward manifestations . . . Even the simulation 
of an emotion tends to ajouse it in our minds" (DARWIN 1872, p. 366). 
In recent years, this perspective has ~rovided  the basis for a substantial body 
of theory and experiment on the functional significance of emotional expression 
(TOMKINS 1962; IZARD 1977; EKMAN et al. 1983; ZAJONC 1985). Although the 
exponents of this theory are sharply divided on the details of the intervening 
mechanism, they all concur that the clearest causal relationship for the intensity of 
affect, or  emotional experience, results from feedback from its expression. This is 
especially true of the species-typical, innate expressions that, in primates, are 
generated primarily by the face (EKMAN 1980). 
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"Emotion" is a multifarious phenomenon, with cognitive, as well as physio- 
logical and affective aspects (COLLIER 1985; HINDE 1985). The continuity between 
emotional and motivational systems has commonly been emphasized, however 
(TOATES 1986). This is particularly true for nonhuman species, where the cogni- 
tive aspects of emotion are less significant (e. g. ANDREW 1963; WEINRICH 1980; 
TOM KIN^ 1984; PLOOG 1986). The equation of animal displays with human 
emotional expression was the central theme of DARWIN:$ (1872) work and has 
been broadly accepted in contemporary ethology (e~g. EIBL-EIBESFELDT 1972). 
The relationship between affect and expression in human emotions is, thus, 
directly applicable to the issue of the functional significance of display behaviors. 
The weight of the experimental evidence strongly favors some form of the 
facial efference hypothesis (LAIRD 1984; COLLIER 1985). In one protocol, subjects 
are instructed to  contract and relax facial muscles that, in combination, produce 
an expression associated with a particular emotional state. They are given a 
plausible excuse for the experiment, usually electromyographic recording, to 
misdirect their attention, and no reference is made to the emotional content of the 
resulting expression. Subsequent evaluation of measures of both self-report of 
emotional experience and physiological arousal has indicated that induction of the 
facial expression causes the experience of a corresponding emotional state. This 
effect has been replicated in a large number of studies, even when data from 
subjects who later indicated an awareness of the emotional content of the induced 
expression were excluded (LAIRD 1984). 
A second protocol involves exposing subjects to emotionally evocative 
stimuli, generally film images. An observer is present who can watch the subjects' 
expressions, but cannot see the screen. The subjects are instructed to exaggerate 
o r  suppress their expressive reactions, supposedly in order to deceive the 
observer. Such studies have also shown significant effects on both self-report 
measures and physiological arousal (LAIRD 1984). In general, the effects have been 
most striking for exaggeration instructions: producing an expression that is more 
intense than the circumstances warrant usually adds to the intensity of the 
experienced emotion, but the inverse effect of suppressing emotional expression is 
weaker and less reliable (COLLIER 1985). The reasons for this disparity are not 
clear, but the result is consistent with the assumption that the feedback relation- 
ship between expression and affect is mainly positive. 
Studies of Aggressive Catharsis 
The classical ethologists considered aggressive behavior to be a consumma- 
tory act, bearing the same relationship to  aggressive motivation that eating bears 
t o  hunger (LORENZ 1950). In the absence of an opportunity for aggressive display, 
the level of aggressive motivation was assumed to increase continuously. Aggres- 
sive behavior was, thus, seen as cathartic because either observing or participating 
in an aggressive interaction could serve to release the accumulated aggressive drive 
(LORENZ 1966). This implies that aggressive behavior should have a negative 
feedback relationship to  arousal: Performance should depress the likelihood of a 
subsequent display, rather than increasing aggressive motivation. The concept of 
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behavioral efference thus contrasts strongly with the classical view of aggressive 
motivation. 
A great deal of effort has been expended in the attempt to demonstrate the 
cathartic effects of viewing or  engaging in aggressive actions, but little experimen- 
tal support has emerged. In general, vicariously experienced aggression, whether 
through sporting events (ARMS, RUSSELL & SANDILANDS 1979) o r  the media 
(GORANSON 1970), seems more consistent with a hypothesis of arousal than with 
catharsis. Observing aggressive behavior generally seems to increase, rather than 
reduce, aggressive feelings (BERKOWITZ 1970). 
There is some support for the possibility that fully realized verbal or physical 
aggression can be cathartic (FESHBACH 1984), but most social scientists now 
attribute this effect to the release of subjects from social inhibitions against 
- 
aggressive expression, rather than a release of pent-up aggressive drives (BER- 
KOWITZ 1962,1970; QUANTY 1976). In QUANTY'S (1976) words, "When situational 
restraints against aggression are lowered by various experimental procedures, . . . 
expression of aggression leads to  increased rather than decreased hostility on 
postaggression measures," a result consistent with the behavioral efference 
model. 
Operant Conditioning Studies 
Testing for the interaction of behavior with motivation in animals is more 
difficult than in humans because self-report measures are not available. Some 
relevant information can, however, be obtained from operant conditioning 
studies in which the opportunity to perform species-typical aggressive displays 
has served as the reinforcer. In a number of different species, this design has 
produced significant conditioning of an otherwise neutral operant (HOGAN & 
ROPER 1978; POTEGAL 1979; HUNTINGFORD & TURNER 1987). Some of the best 
work has been performed with Siamese fighting fish, Betta splendens, in which 
the opportunity to engage in aggressive displays is sufficiently rewarding that it 
can readily be transferred to secondary reinforcers, such as a light that had 
previously been paired with the presentation of an opponent (THOMPSON 1969; 
HOGAN & ROPER 1978). 
It is difficult to be certain that it is the opportunity for aggression that is 
reinforcing in these preparations. Some other feature of the reward situation, such 
as an exposure to  novel stimuli, an increase in general activity, or  simply an 
opportunity to associate wish a conspecific, could be responsible for the effect 
(HUNTINGFORD & TURNE~-1987). Careful experimental studies using a wide range 
of stimuli have eliminated most of these alternatives, however (BOLS 1977). The 
extensive literature showing appetitive behavior for aggression even in field 
situations also lends support to  the interpretation of aggression as reinforcing 
(HINDE 1970). 
The crucial point for the behavioral efference hypothesis is that if aggressive 
behavior is reinforcing for an arbitrary operant, then it must be self-reinforcing 
under circumstances of free elicitation (POTEGAL 1979): Like virtue, aggression is 
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its own reward. BAENNINGER (1974) has drawn this same inference and gener- 
alized from it to an independent statement of the behavioral efference hypothesis: 
"If the operant, or  emitted, response, which is reinforced by the opportunity 
to behave aggressively, is itself an attack or threat response, then the 
probability that the aggressive response will occur again is increased simply 
by virtue of the fact that it is associated with performance of an aggressive 
response. Aggressive responses would then be self-rbnforcing. Each aggres- 
sive response would be positively reinforced by its-oGn performance in a 
kind of positive feedback loop" (1974, p. 25). 
These studies thus constitute some of the best currently available evidence 
for the behavioral efference model. 
Discussion 
The behavioral efference hypothesis provides a feasible resolution for the 
game-theory paradox. Displays afford a truthful rendering of underlying aggres- 
sive motivation, at least in part because the performance of the display is 
instrumental in producing the realized motivational level. Revealing information 
about "intentions" is not selected against because the principal function of display 
is not communication but regulation of the rate of aggressive arousal. It may be 
disadvantageous to reveal one's intentions but it is far worse to forego the benefits 
of a graded arousal process. The need for secrecy is only one of the selective 
processes acting on aggressive behavior, and it may not be the most important one 
(COLGAN 1988; TURNER & HUNTINGFORD 1986). 
Display without Communication 
In addition to resolving the paradox, behavioral efference also offers a useful 
perspective on several other, otherwise anomalous, behavioral phenomena 
including displays that occur outside of normal aggressive contexts. Aggressive 
behavior often deviates from the idealized concept of a reciprocal, nonverbal 
conversation (SMITH 1977). Animals occasionally perform aggressive displays even 
in the absence of conspecifics. They may also display in a group of conspecifics, 
none of whom appears to be attending to the behavior. Even when there is a 
designated recipient for the display, a surprisingly large proportion of supposedly 
communicative actions produce no detectable response. 
SMITH (1977) attributes such observations to the potentiating or "primer" 
functions of displays. Despite their unresponsiveness, recipients are presumed to 
be absorbing and integrating information about the displaying individual that will 
ultimately influence their long-term interactions. Whether animals do integrate 
such information in any meaningful fashion over the long term is difficult to 
assess. What is clear, however, is that if displays serve to increase aggressive 
arousal their performance in the absence of fully attentive recipients is under- 
standable. 
A highly aggressive individual requires only a trivial eliciting stimulus to 
produce a display. Even just the presence of another conspecific may suffice. The 
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production of a display, in its turn, feeds back to maintain the aggressive state. 
Even in the absence of reciprocal displays, then, behavioral efference in highly' 
motivated animals may be enough to maintain a continuous, erratic output of 
aggressive displays, in a process akin to the "run-on" or "ticking overn of a 
poorly tuned gasoline engine. 
The Principle of Antithesis 
Submissive displays commonly contain features that appear to be derived 
from a simple inversion of some aspect of the aggressive posture of the species 
(MORRIS 1956). DARWIN (1872) termed this the Principle of Antithesis, noting that 
such behavior patterns could only have evolved their communicatory significance 
by virtue of "being in complete opposition or antithesis to the attitude and 
movements which, from intelligible causes, are assumed when [an animal] intends 
to fight, and which consequently are expressive of anger" (1872, p. 51). 
DARWIN'S principle appears to provide an explanation for more features of 
submissive postures than the alternative notions that submissive displays involve 
exposing some vulnerable part of the body (LORENZ 1966) o r  concealing struc- 
tures used in attack or  threat (TINBERGEN & MOYNIHAN 1952; MORRIS 1956). The 
hypothesis has, however, generated little research, possibly because its evolution- 
ary basis is obscure. DARWIN himself was not clear on the mechanism, attributing 
antithetical displays to the "unconscious" performance, through "habit and 
association," of actions of a directly opposite kind (DARWIN 1872). 
One of the attractive features of behavioral efference is that it provides a 
coherent evolutionary context for the development of antithetical displays. In 
animals that were compelled to remain in close proximity to aggressive con- 
specifics there would be strong selection for mechanisms that suppressed aggres- 
sive arousal, thereby reducing the likelihood of periodic flare-ups. Submissive 
behavior, by opposing the actions that express aggression, opposes the positive 
motivational feedback that leads, through the cascading of motivation and display 
behavior, to a physical attack. 
An animal performing actions that are fully antithetical to aggressive displays 
is, therefore, inhibiting the acceleration of its own aggressive predispositions. 
Such displays can, thus, be thought of as an additional level of control on the 
course of an aggressive interaction. This concept is reminiscent of CHANCE'S 
(1962) theory of "cut-off" acts, in which an attack response is suppressed by 
behavior that involves looking fl away from the other individual. 
Submissive display~will, of course, also reduce an individual's value as an 
aggressive stimulus to his opponent. As with the communicatory effects of 
aggressive displays, however, this cannot have been the principal selective influ- 
ence. Without a direct connection between the physiology of aggression and its 
expression in the animal's behavior, submissive displays are also paradoxical 
because they are open to exploitation by deceitful individuals. Behaving submis- 
sively (e.g. by waving a white flag) to draw an opponent off-guard and leave him 
vulnerable to a surprise attack is an old and reliable tactic in human warfare. 
Approaches for Further Research 
Quantitative experimental investigation of behavioral efference poses several 
formidable problems. Aggressive displays are most readily elicited through staged 
encounters with an appropriate opponent. The behavior of the opponent inevi- 
tably provides a confounding source of stimulation and inhibition, however, 
which generally precludes a coherent test of the motivational effects of the 
subject's behavior. , , 
A variety of methods involving models or puppets have been employed in 
ethological studies to control and manipulate the eliciting stimuli for aggression. 
Such simulations only roughly approximate the stimulus configuration provided 
by a real opponent and generally lack the flexibility necessary to reproduce a 
range of display intensities (but see AMLANER & STOUT 1978). The use of film 
images of a displaying animal could potentially yield precise stimulus control, but 
the technical difficulties are considerable (JENSSEN 1970). 
A second problem for ethological studies of behavioral efference is the need 
to measure the subject animal's motivation independently of its display behavior. 
This has been accomplished in studies of human facial efference by measurement 
of autonomic responses (EKMAN et al. 1983), and similar techniques may be 
feasible in animal preparations (KLING et al. 1979; WALLETSCHEK & RAAB 1982). 
The most promising approach seems to be offered by neurophysiological 
techniques for chronic implantation of stimulatory electrodes in freely interacting 
animals. Aggressive behavior of varying intensities can often be reliably evoked in 
these subjects by varying the imposed electric current (KLING 1986). Several 
studies have been performed in which aggressive behavior was electronically 
manipulated in social contexts (DELGADO 1963, 1969; ROBINSON et al. 1969). 
H~ccou et al. (1988) recently explored social interactions in electrically stimu- 
lated Norway rats, using Markov analysis for separating out the effects of an 
opponent's behavior. An extension of their design could readily be used to 
quantify the effects of display production on arousal. 
One feasible protocol would make use of the stimulation assay pioneered by 
von HOLST & VON SAINT PAUL (1963). In this design, stimulatory electrodes would 
be implanted in the brain of a subject animal. It would then be exposed to an 
appropriate eliciting stimulus, either a model or a conspecific opponent. The 
amount of direct electrical stimulation required to obtain attack behavior would 
then be measured. In the comparison treatment, the subject would first be 
allowed to perform aggressive displays and then subsequently would be subjected 
to direct electrical stimulation. If behavioral efference is present, the displaying 
subjects should require significantly less electrical stimulation to induce attack. 
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